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I. INTRODUCTION 
A feature of the Belgian economy is the regular concertation between 
government and the financial sector. In a mixed economy, the govern- 
ment takes on a variety of  roles with respect to the financial sector 
(Bruni et al. (1982)). In this paper, we want to focus on one aspect 
of this many-sided relationship namely the financing conditions of go- 
vernment debt. More specific, we focus on the interest rate determi- 
nation of  one financial instrument issued by the government namely 
the treasury bill. 
Typically, in OECD countries, the treasury bill rate is lower than 
the interbank rate. The Belgian situation showed the opposite before 
the money market reform of january 29th 1991. The Belgian treasury 
bill rate exceeded the interbank rate. Research concerning this phe- 
nomenon has not been satisfactory up to now. Hence, there existed 
a need for further elaborating the relation between the interbank rate 
and the treasury bill rate. This paper proposes an application of a ge- 
neralised  asymmetric Nash bargaining model (Kalai (1977)) to the 
treasury bill rate determination process. In the economic literature, 
a lot of work has been done concerning bargaining problems between 
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and Svejnar (1991)) and between consumers and pharmaceutical in- 
novators (Van Cayseele  (1987)). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section I1 provides some eviden- 
ce on government' financing conditions by looking at covered interest 
rate parity and by  analysing the relation between  government debt 
and interest rates. The bargaining framework together with the em- 
pirical results are introduced in section 111. Section IV characterises 
the recent Belgian money market changes. Section V presents some 
conclusions. In the appendix the data sources and description are gi- 
ven. 
11. THE FINANCING CONDITIONS IN THE LITERATURE 
A. Covered interest rate purify 
Traditionally, the theory of interest rate parity is more or less accep- 
ted for the Eurocurrency markets (Fratianni and Wakeman (1982)). 
The covered interest rate parity theorem can be written as follows 
(Grabbe (1986)): 
where i  = the interest rate on the domestic currency unit 
iF  = the interest rate on the foreign currency unit 
S = the spot exchange rate, expressed as the number of units 
of  the domestic currency per unit of  foreign currency 
F = the forward exchange rate 
t  = time index 
To test whether this condition holds between  the Euro-Belgian 
franc (Euro-BF) and the Euro-Deutsche mark (Euro-DM) on the one 
hand and between the Belgian treasury bill rate and the Euro-DM 
rate on the other hand, we test thc following relationships : 
1 + EBF,  = a[gr]  (1 + EMR,)  +  U, 
1 
1 + r,  ,,L  =  /3[!  '1  (1 + EMR,)  + v, 
where EBF = the Euro-BF mean1 rate on three-months deposits 
EMR = the Euro-DM mean rate on three-months deposits TABLE 1 
Interest  rate parity  estimations  (1  985 :5-l990  :6j 
es (1)  es  (2) 
coeff.  stand.error  coeff.  stand.error 
EMR  0.99996  8.61 E-05  1.000201  9.13 E-05 
R'  0.956  0.950 
s.e.r.  0.068%  0.072% 
D.W.  2.226  2.176 
Source :  Own  calculations 
r  = the three-months Belgian treasury bill rate 
S  = the spot exchange rare expressed as the number of  BF 
per unit of  DM 
F  = the three-months forward exchange rate" 
U, v  = error terms 
The estimations are performed with end-of-month data3  for the pe- 
riod 1985 5-1990 :64. Ordinary least squares is used as estimation me- 
thod. The results are presented  in Table 1. 
The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the disturbance terms 
has not to be rejected at a significance level of  5% as can be seen 
from the Durbin Watson (D.W.) statistic5. The overall performance 
of  both regressions is well. As determination coefficient, an expres- 
sion valid for regressions without constant term is calculated6 (Barten 
(1987)). One clearly cannot reject the perfect integration of the Euro- 
BF and Euro-DM market since the coefficient of EMR is statistically 
insigni- ficant different from one. The null hypothesis of  perfect sub- 
stitutability between the three-months Belgian  treasury bill market 
and the three-months Euro-DM market has to be rejected at a sig- 
nificance level of 5%. Hence, the treasury bill and Euro-DM may be 
analysed within  the frame of  segmented markets. 
Naudts and Schoklcaert (1988) considered this imperfect substitu- 
tability due to asset related risk. Institutional factors such as regula- 
tions to force financial institutions to hold a minimum fraction of their 
portfolio in the form of treasury bills are also relevant for causing im- 
perfect  substitutability. Bargaining power  could be incorporated in 
these institutional factors and hence cause segmented markets. Some 
additional evidence is presented in Table 2 where the treasury bill and 
interbank rate are compared for some OECD countries. TABLE 2 
Compalisoiz  between the treaszlly bill rate  (r ) and  the interbank  rate  (h) 
(the rnean for  1985 -  1989, 3-months rate) 
r  ib  ib - rt 
U.S.  6.81  7.65  0.84 
U.K.  10.81  11.38  0.57 
Germ(1)  4.42  5.06  0.64 
Italy  11.91  12.83  0.92 
Ireland  10.11  10.44  0.33 
Belgium  7.87  7.70  -0.17 
(1) ib  = 3-months I-, ,  = 12-months 
Source:  International Financial Statistics 
O.E.C.D. Financial Statistics 
Central Bank of  Ireland Quarterly Bulletin 
CESi\/IOivi darabase 
Typically, the treasury bill rate is lower than the interbank rate also 
for high debt1GNP countries. One has to be careful with the evidence 
for Italy since some fiscal measures were taken to improve the attrac- 
tiveness of  holding Italian treasury bills. Belgium is the only country 
where the treasury bill rate exceeds the interbank rate. During the 
period 1985 - 1989, the interbank rate was seventeen basis points lo- 
wer than the treasury bill rate. Below, we argue that the Belgian evi- 
dence results from bargaining power of  the financial sector with res- 
pect to the treasury bill rate determination. 
B. Government debt and interest rates 
Until recently, government liabilities were considered to be risk free 
assets par excellence.  The treasury bill  rate was considered  as  the 
benchmark yield in the money market whereas the government bond 
yield played the same role in the capital market. A lot of  countries 
have experienced during the last two decades growing budget deficits 
and accumulated a high stock of  government debt. In this context, 
some explanations are given about the link between the size of  the 
government debt and the interest rates. There exist two strands of  li- 
terature. Both strands assume the government will fully honor its debt 
obligations in the future. The first view is the Ricardian Equivalence 
Hypothesis (Barro (1974)), which states that individuals have perfect 
foresight and hence foresee that government borrowing will generate 
additional taxes in the future. Then rational and altruistic consumers reduce their consumption by  an amount which enables them to pay 
the future taxes. Or government borrowing is seen as a perfect sub- 
stitute for saving such that the level of the interest rates remains unaf- 
fected. A second strand of  literature claims there is  an effect from 
government debt on the level of  the interest rates. Increases in  go- 
vernment bonds lead to an increase in private sector wealth and hence 
in current aggregate consumption and aggregate demand. Private sa- 
vings goes up by less than the increase in government debt. Real in- 
terest rates rise and some crowding out of  private investment occurs 
(Plosser (1982)). However, all those channels generate effects on the 
general level of interest rates. The financing conditions of  the govern- 
ment vis-a-vis the private sector remain unaltered. 
Recently the question was raised whether there exists an issuer spe- 
cific premium also for assets issued by  the government  (De Eroeck 
(1990), Annaert (1991)). This approach drops the assumption of fully 
honoring the debt obligations in the future. An issuer-specific pre- 
mium would be incorporated in the interest rate on government debt 
since financial markets perceived that holding government liabilities 
is no longer as safe as before. Governments may have an incentive 
to tax or inflate away their debt obligations in the future. Hence, in- 
vestors require a premium to hold government debt. The evidence on 
those issuer-specific premia points to low premia (De Broeck (1990)). 
Therefore, additional research to explain the superiority of  the trea- 
sury bill  rate with  respect  to the interbank rate  (Lefebvre  (1990)) 
would be welcome. Here, a first step in this direction is taken. 
111. THE MODEL 
Until january 29th 1991, the treasury bill rate was 'de jure' determined 
by the Central Bank of  Belgium in communication with the Belgian 
Minister of  Finance. Treasury bills were tendered on tap. The market 
was reserved solely for Belgian and Luxemburg financial institutions7. 
The treasury bill rate served a dual purpose. On the one hand, the 
government used the treasury bill rate as an instrument of monetary 
policy. On the other hand, treasury bills were used to finance a large 
part of government debt. By this dual purpose, banks and government 
are engaged in a bargaining situation to determine the treasury bill 
rate. A. Bargaining model 
Banks (B) and Government (G) are engaged in a bargaining situation 
to determine the interest rate on treasury bills (r ). The threat point 
of both B and G have to be stipulated in order to characterize a solu- 
tion. 
Banks can threaten the government  to stop the financing of  the 
short term debt and switch their available funds to the closest sub- 
stitute. The interbank market or Euro-BF market can be seen as the 
closest available one since they have a comparable maturity and cur- 
rency denomination8. On those markets, the banks can only achieve 
the bid rate since they want to deposit their available funds. Whenever 
the treasury bill rate is lower than the Euro-BF bid rate (EBF ), the 
L  "L  L  C..  +  C ..,,  DC ,,,  .  +  1, 
V~II~S  SWILLII  LIILII IUIIUS  LU the LUIU-LU  lllalhei. 111 the long run, !:W- 
ever, banks could change their portfolio behavior and tap new markets 
e.g. markets for government financing of  other countries or extend 
the financing to private companies. In this paper, we take the EBF 
rate as the banks'  threat point. 
The government's threat point is to stop the printing of  treasury 
bills and borrow on the international money market. Assuming she 
takes  up Belgian francs, she has  to pay  the Euro-BF offered rate 
(EBF) plus a lending margin (lm) charged by the consortium of Euro- 
market banks. The government has  to pay  an additional premium 
FIGURE  1 
The threat points  of  the bargaining parties 
interest 
rate 
EBFoff + Im 
EBFbid 
0 above the interbank offered rate since she is not allowed to operate 
directly on the international money market. Whenever r exceeds EBF 
plus the charged lending margin, the government exercises her threat 
and borrows on the international money market. In the long run, how- 
ever, she could change her behavior by issuing more long term bonds. 
In Belgium this was not a solution since, until recently, the issues of 
government bonds were underwritten by  a syndicate of  financial in- 
stitutions that guaranteed the placement of the bonds with the public. 
For the empirical analysis, we take EBF + lm as threat point. In Fi- 
gure 1 the threat points are shown on an interest rate line. 
It is reasonable to assume that gaps between government expen- 
ditures and receipts are the primary determinant of  the amount of 
treasury bills issued. We assume the supply of  treasury bills not to be 
sensitive with respect to the interest rate within the interval [EBF,,,, 
EBF,,,  + lm] (Cook and Lawler (1984)). Hence we assume that the 
size of the government deficit and the division between short and long 
term debt remains unaltered whenever the threat point is exercised. 
Under the constraints generated by both threat points each party 
maximizes its utility. Suppose the government has the following utility 
function : 
where Q is the amount of  short term debt to be financed 
r, ,  is the three-months treasury bill rate 
y  is a parameter reflecting attitude towards risk 
The banks' utility function is specified as follows : 
v 
V,,(Q,r,  ,)  = Q kLd 
Z1 
where Q is the amount of  short term debt to be financed 
r, ,  is the three-months treasury bill rate 
u  is a parameter reflecting attitude towards risk 
The coefficient of  relative risk aversion, R, is given by  the following 
formula : 
( Pratt (1964)) and equals l-y for the government and l-v  for the banks. If  R>O the 
parties are risk averse. On the contrary, if  R<O they are risk loving9. 
Risk neutrality  appears if  R =  0 or y  =  u =  l. 
Since the threat point of  G equals EBF,,  + lm, we  generate the 
following 0-normalised utility function : 
Introducing the threat point within the banks'  utility function gene- 
rates the following expression : 
Already in 1950, Nash presented an axiomatic model to achieve a uni- 
que bargaining outcome by  presupposing four axioms (Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1991)). The axioms are Invariance to Equivalent Utility 
FIGURE 2 
The Nash solution for  y  =v = l 
Ub 
EBFoff + Im  - rtb)(rtb  - EBFbid) = cst 
EBFoff + Im 
- EBFbid 
EBFbid 
EBFoff + Im  EBFoff + Irn  ug 
- EBFbid Representations, Symmetry, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
and pareto-~fficienc~". 
As Nash showed, the unique outcome is generated by maximizing 
the following expression : 
max [U,(Q,rt  ,)l  [Ub(Q?rt  ,)I 
rt b,Q 
The solution maximizes the product of  the players' gains. This is 
the utility they get in the solution minus the utility received when car-  p 
qiiig out their threat. The Nash s~!uti=n  far y =c  =  ? 2nd 2 g?.,ien  Q 
can be represented  as in Figure 2. 
On the horizontal and vertical axis respectively, the utility of  go- 
vernment and banks are shown. The origin represents the disagree- 
ment point. The set S is the feasible set. If  one of  both players exer- 
cises his threat, the product of  the utilities becomes zero. The Nash 
solution is reached where the highest indifference curve is tangent to 
S. This is where r, ,  = (EBF,,,  + EBF,,  + lm)/2. The parties divide 
the surplus into two equal pieces. 
In 1977 Kalai presented an article where he proposed a maximand 
to reach a general asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. This maxi- 
mand implies both players to act as if they maximize the weighted ave- 
rage of their utilities, the weights being their respective bargaining po- 
wer coefficients. Applying this theory we become the following ad- 
justed  maximand : 
If  6 equals zero, the government  has all bargaining power. The re- 
verse holds if  6 equals one. 
The first-order condition  (F.O.C.) then is : 
The left hand side of  (3) equals the ratio of  bargaining powers. The right hand side equals the ratio of  the utilities times the treasury bill 
rate to the exponent of  the difference in relative  risk  'behavior'.  If 
v =  y  then the ratio of bargaining powers equals the ratio of  utilities. 
Assuming risk neutrality for both bargaining parties (y =  v = 1) redu- 
ces the F.O.C. to 
r, ,  = 6(EBFOff  +  lm)  + (1-6) EBF,,, 
Since EBF,,  = EBF,,,  + bidlask spread, the above expression can 
be rewritten  as 
r, ,  = EBF,,,  + 6 spread  (4) 
where spread equals the lending margin (lm) plus the bidlask spread. 
Equation (4) gives us an expression with 6 the bargaining power 
of the banks. If  6 equals one, the banks can extract the whole surplus. 
On the contrary, if  6 equals zero, the government pays the EBF rate 
FIGURE  3 
The treasury bill rate  determination game 
EBFbid 
+  spread 
EBFbid 
Ub=O TABLE 3 
Estinzation  results for  equatio1.l  (4) (1985  :5-1990  :6) 
free  constrained 
coeff.  stand.error  coeff.  stand.error 
EBF,,,"  1.00795  (0.01532)  1 
spread1'  0.18021  (0.22583)  0.2967  (0.0249) 
R'  0.993  0.993 
D.W.  1.754  1.736 
Source :  Own calculations 
and receives the entire cake. This is shown in Figure 3 where G de- 
cotes. the exegenags given amount  c?f  trezsuq bills the government 
prints. 
Equation (4) was estimated for the period 1985 5-1990 :6. Only an- 
nual data for the lending margin are available. We assumed the len- 
ding margin to be constant during the year. First a free regression was 
run in order to test if  the coefficient of  EBF equals one. A second 
regression was run with the coefficient of  EBF fixed at one. The re- 
sults are shown in Table 111. 
Notice that the estimated bargaining power is very sensitive to the 
fixation of the EBF coefficient at one. However, fixing this coefficient 
at one, as derived by  the F.O.C., considerably improves the estimate 
of  the bargaining power. Again the coefficient of  determination was 
computed for a regression without constant. The null hypothesis  of 
no autocorrelation can not be rejected at a significance level of 5%. 
We can not reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient of EBF equal 
to one. The bargaining power of  the banks (government) equals ap- 
proximately 30 (70) percent. It is obvious that we have to reject the 
symmetric Nash-bargaining solution. 
Equation (4) is of course not the end of  the story. As argued supra 
their exists an issuer-specific premium as well for banks as for govern- 
ment. The difference in issuer-specific premia between those bargai- 
ning parties has to be integrated into the model. Hence, the estimate 
of  bargaining power will be biased in equation (4) since bargaining 
power and difference in default premia clutter up. In order to achieve 
an unbiased estimate of bargaining power, we have to correct for the 
possible  difference in default  premia between  Euro-banks and the 
Belgian  government. This is the concern of  the next section. B. Default premia 
The objective of  this section is to generate the difference in issuer- 
specific premia between  the Euro-banks and the Belgian Treasury. 
Euro-banks dealing in Irish pound or Belgian franc have the same 
issuer-specific premium. Since the Republic of  Ireland has a compa- 
rable debt1GNP ratio, it can be argued that the Belgian and Irish go- 
vernment have the same issuer-specific premium. The Irish treasury 
bill rate (Exchequer bill rate) can be assumed to be free of bargaining 
power due to the competitive way of  interest rate determination on 
Exchequer bills.  Exchequer  bills  are weekly issued  by  the Central 
Bank on behalf of the Ministiy of Finance. They are issued by auction 
in which  individuals  (residents and non-residents) 15 and the non- 
bank institutions  (h--- 
-A  4-  -:--  :--+:+.-+:---  :  ..-.- "'---\  -I-- 
11ulllL allu  ~~~~~~~~L~U~~d  ~~IVC;>LUI>,  LUCLY  alau 
bid, through a bank or stockbroker. Due to this alternative way of rate 
determination, we can assume that the Irish exchequer bill rate does 
not incorporate bargaining power. 
Fama (1986) defines the difference in default premia between two 
market securities as the difference between  two market returns for 
the same combination of buy and sell maturities. Fama concludes that 
default premia decline with maturity. For the present purposes, this 
is no problem since we concentrate on three-months treasury bills and 
three-months Euro-market deposits. He also concluded the default 
premium to be related with the business cycle. According to the en- 
compassed period, i.e. 1985 5-1990 :6, we computed the average of 
all default premia and took this as a proxy for the difference in default 
premia between the Irish government and the Euro-banks. Using Fa- 
ma's definition, the difference in default premia between the Euro- 
banks and the Irish government equals : 
EIR - rt ,,ir 
with  EIR the three-months  Dublin  interbank  mean  rate  on Irish 
pound 
r, ,,  the three-months Exchequer bill rate. 
We take this difference in issuer-specific premia as representative 
for the difference in issuer-specific premia between the Euro-banks 
and the Belgian government since we assume the Irish government 
has the same issuer-specific premium as the Belgian government. The difference in default premia between the Belgian government and the 
Euro-banks (rp) equals then 
rp  = EIR - rt bi,  (5) 
This difference in default premia has to be integrated within the bar- 
gaining model. 
C. Bargaining model incorporating default premia 
Integrating  the  default  premium  of  equation  (5) into  the  Nash- 
Zeuthen-Harsanyi frame generates the following adjusted maximand : 
with U-  = ~[(EBhid  + spread)'  - (rt b)'] 
m  Y 
v  U 
Ub = Q[rt  b  - (EBFbid - rp)  1 
21 
The F.O.C., conditional on risk neutrality  (u  = y  = l), is 
rt ,  = EBFbid + 6 spread - (1 - 6) rp  (6) 
If 6 equals one, the treasury bill rate equals the EBF,,  rate plus the 
spread. On the contrary if  6 equals zero, the government pays the EBF 
rate minus the difference in default premia rp. 
TABLE 4 
Estimation  results for  equation  (6) (1985 :5-1990  :6) 
free  constrained 
coeff.  stand.error  coeff.  stand.error 
EBFm  0.98996  (0.01731)  1 
spread  0.65832  (0.15777)  0.5673  (0.01637) 
'P  0.34168  0.4327 
0.993  0.993 
s.e.r.  1.411%  1.403% 
D.W.  1.554  1.552 
Source :  Own calculations The results of  estimating equation (6) with ordinary least squares 
are presented in Table 4. The null hypothesis of  no autocorrelation 
can neither be accepted nor rejected at a significance level of 5%. An 
valid for regressions without constant term was computed. Again 
a free regression was run in order to test if  the coefficient of EBF,,, 
equals one. The estimate of the bargaining power is significantly dif- 
ferent from zero. The regression points to a bargaining power of  57 
percent for the banks and 43 percent for the government. Symmetry 
has to be rejected in favor of the asymmetric case (1% critical t-value). 
The results show a smaller bargaining power for government than for 
the banks. The integration of  the difference in default premia bet- 
ween the Euro-banks and the government causes an upswing in banks 
estimated bargaining power. This upswing is due to the fact that banks 
extract the entire difference in default premia in additinn to their pre- 
vious estimated bargaining power. The reverse analysis can be made 
for the government. The bargaining power of  the banks is reflected 
in the interest rate paid by the government. Banks' bargaining power 
consists of  two components. Firstly, banks extract the entire differen- 
ce in default premia between the bargaining parties. Secondly, the go- 
vernment pays a higher interest rate than the interbank rate. 
IV. BELGIAN MONEY MARKET REFORM 
Since january 29th  1991 an auction procedure is used to determine 
the treasury bill rate. Non-financial institutions as well as financial in- 
stitutions, non-residents as well  as residents can pass through their 
bids to buy treasury bills. All bids are centralised within the Central 
Bank. Allocations take place at the most favorable bid 18 prices, up 
to the point at which the desired amount is purchased or placed. If 
accepted, each bidder receives the rate indicated in the bid he sub- 
mitted  ("U.S. allocation system")16. 
An argument often used to motivate the recent changes of the trea- 
sury bill rate determination process is the level of the short term debt 
and hence the inherent saving on expenses. However, already in 1986 
there was a huge amount of treasury bills. With this argument in mind, 
why did the government not invent the reform before ? 
Before january  29th  1991, the treasury bill  market was  used by 
banks to optimize their liquidity positions. Hence, every change in the 
treasury bill rate was transmitted into the other money market rates. 
A side effect was that every expansion or reduction in the money mar- ket was passed on the Treasury such that she had to use her 'special 
credit line' with the Central Bank of  Belgium. One of  the conditions 
to come to the second step of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union is the absence of  monetary financing of  government debt. To 
suit this, one had to rearrange the role of  the treasury bill such that 
the treasury bill rate looses a lot of its importance as a monetary policy 
instrument. The government uses the treasury bill more as an instru- 
ment to finance part of  its debt. This gives government opportunities 
to reduce the bargaining power of  the financial sector. 
Auctions are held periodically to introduce competition. To attract 
new investors, a secondary market was set up which has to reflect cor- 
rect market prices. In view of  this, fourteen 'primary dealers' were 
selected in order to create an efficient secondary market. Those 'pri- 
mary dealers' can generate fee Susincss in order t~  cGmpensate fer 
the loss they bear in the primary market. By  this way the banks coo- 
perative behavior was broken. 
By  the introduction of  an auction procedure open to other market 
participants,  banks  and government  are not acting in  a bargaining 
game 19 anymore. One can expect the treasury bill rate to become 
lower than the interbank rate. Evidence for the first months after the 
reform is given in Table 5. 
We notice that the gap between the interbank rate and the secon- 
dary market treasury bill rate has disappeared. The treasury bill rate 
is only slightly below the interbank rate unlike other OECD countries. 
TABLE 5 
The treasu?y bill rate  and  the interbanlc rate after janz~aly  29th 1991 (rate on three 
months) 
17  rt b  ib 
feb 91  9.59  9.58 
mar 91  9.34  9.33 
apr 91  9.26  9.24 
may 91  9.04  9.05 
jun  91  9.13  9.15 
jul  91  9.18  9.20 
aug 91  9.30  9.33 
sep 91  9.21  9.25 
oct 91  9.28  9.32 
nov  91  9.44  9.48 
Soul.ce:  Tijdschrift van de NBB, November  1991 The reservation of the market for Belgian and Luxembourg financial 
institutions during many years has probably created some barriers. It 
might take some time to convince other market participants to submit 
bids to buy treasury bills. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Until january 29th 1991, the Belgian treasury bill rate exceeded the 
interbank rate. This phenomenon was not observed in other OECD 
countries although some of them have a comparable debt/GNP ratio. 
Up to now, no satisfactory explanation was given for this observation. 
In this paper, we argue that banks had bargaining power with res- 
pect iv the treasury biii rate determination. This bargaining  power 
existed since the market for treasury bills was reserved solely for Bel- 
gian and Luxemburg financial institutions. This reservation brought 
banks and government in a bargaining situation. This feature is mo- 
delled by setting up a generalised asymmetric Nash bargaining model. 
Banks  and government  divide  the difference between  their threat 
points The threat points are the Euro-Belgian franc bid rate minus 
the difference in default premia for the banks, and, the Euro-Belgian 
franc offered rate plus a lending margin for the government. 
Empirical results show that banks aproximately go halves with go- 
vernment. The bargaining power of  the banks is reflected in the in- 
terest rate paid by the government. Banks' bargaining power consists 
of two components. Firstly, banks extract the entire difference in de- 
fault premia between the bargaining parties. Secondly, in addition, 
the government pays a higher interest rate than the interbank rate. 
Since january 29th 1991, an auction procedure is used to determine 
the treasury bill  rate.  Non-financial  institutions and non-residents 
may also bid. The switch in interest rate determination is justified  in 
the light of the European Economic and Monetary Union. More spe- 
cific, monetary financing of government debt will be constrained. The 
introduction of  the auction procedure had positive results. The first 
evidence shows that the treasury bill rate became slightly lower than 
the interbank rate. Convincing other investors to make substantial 
bids could induce a larger gap between the treasury bill and interbank 
rate. APPENDIX 
Data references 
CESMOM Database Leuven 
- Euro-Belgian franc mean rate on three-months  quoted on the basis of  a 365-day year. 
- Euro-Deutsche Mark mean rate on three-months quoted on the basis of  a 360-day year. 
- Treasury bill  rate on three-months quoted on the basis of  a 360-day year. 
Financieel Ekonomische Tijd 
- spot exchange rate BFIDM 
- forward premium BFIDM-three months 
Central Bank of  Ireland Quarterly Bulletin 
- forward  premium 
- Exchequer bill rate on three-months quoted on the basis of  a 365-day year 
- Dublin interbank mean rate on three-months Irish pound quoted on the basis of a 365-day 
year 
Financial Market Trends 
- spread on international bank loans OECD-area 
NOTES 
1. The mean of  the bid and offer rate. The bid interest rate is the rate at which the bank 
will accept deposits from other banks and the asked or offer interest rate is the rate 
at which the bank will lend to other banks. The difference between the bid and asked 
rate is called  the bidlasked  or bidloffer  spread. 
2.  The spot exchange rate as well as the forward premia or discounts are based on mid- 
rates. 
3.  To measure true deviations from covered interest parity, it is important to have data 
on the exchange and interest rate recorded at the same instant in time at which a trader 
could have dealt (Taylor (1987)). Here we use end-of-month data but are not sure these 
data were gathered at the same instant in time. However, for the present purposes, 
we  need not be worried too much since those interest parity estimations are not the 
main concern of  our paper. 
4. We took 1985 :5 as starting date since the treasury bill rate was introduced as instrument 
of  monetary policy begin may  1985. Since may  1985, the official discount  rates have 
been fixed weekly in relation to (in practice higher than) the rate on three-months trea- 
sury bills. This serves to discourage the use of central bank credit by banks to finance 
the acquisition  of  short-term government securities  (Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh 
(1989)). 
5.  Strictly speaking, in a regression  without  constant term, the Durbin-Watson bounds 
should be adapted. Here, the bounds test is performed with the usual D.W.-bounds. 
6.  The R computed by  the TSP package is  not valid since the mean of  the disturbance 
term in a regression without constant term is not equal to zero. The concept proposed 
by  Barten  (1987) is preferred. For a tough  analysis of  this topic,  see Barten  (1987). 
7.  No single financial institution is able to serve the entire trea- sury bill market since the 
required amount is  too large. Hence we assume the financial institutions to cooperate 
with respect to their objectives such that the Nash bargaining  game is  applicable. 
8. Fama (1986) concluded for the United States that treasury bills produce positive average 
term premiums while average term premiums for private issuer securities are close to 
zero. In our framework, no problem with term premiums exists since both treasury bills 
and Euro-market securities note at par value after three months. Or in the frame of 
Fama,B IS  (Buy  a three-months security and selling it at expiry date, this is at zero months to maturity) has the same return as forward return such that the term premium 
for both types of  securities equals zero. 
9.  The utility functions  denote constant relative  risk-aversion  (loving). 
10. We refer to Osborne and Rubinstein  (1991). pp.11-l3 for a comprehensive  interpre- 
tation  of  those  axioms. 
11. As Clinton (1988) states, in an active interbank market, posted bid-ask spreads are in- 
variably 0.125 percent. Therefore, we took the mean rate and subtracted 0.0625 percent 
to get the EBF rate. 
12. Data for the spread were gathered in several issues of  Financial Market Trends. We 
took the spread for the OECD-area. To reduce clutter, we need exact data on spreads 
for short-term credits including management  fees. However, more accurate data are 
not  available to our knowledge. 
13. We have to be careful  in comparing the determination coefficient as measure of  em- 
pirical performance since the denominator of  the R is  changed when restrictions are 
imposed on the estimated parameters. 
14. Covered interest rate parity between the three-months EIR and the three-months EBF 
could  not be rejected  at a significance level of  5%. 
15. Residents for whom the withholding tax is the final tax are not allowed to make offers. 
16. For further details see Jaarverslag Nationale  Rank van  Relgie (?990), p. 105-115. 
17. Secondary market returns 
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